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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
RELIGIOUS INSTRUCTION IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS

New Mexico. Plaintiffs, as taxpayers, brought an action in an
attempt to end the teaching of religious beliefs by Catholic sisters
in a State-supported school and, among other things, to prohibit
the sisters from teaching in their religious robes. The religious
instruction period was made a part of the regular school day, and
the buses which brought the children to the schools were operated
on a schedule which allowed the instruction to be given. The New
Mexico Supreme Court upheld the judgment of the district court
and ordered that those teachers who violated their orders and
engaged in religious teaching should be forbidden to teach again
in the public schools of the State.'
This case was the result of a long and involved religious and
educational disagreement involving several schools in New Mexico.
The case involved numerous points and fact situations too detailed
to be mentioned here.
The case is another judicial statement that Church and State
must not pool resources or confuse or intermingle their powers.
The New Mexico court had a rather clear case before it here, for
religious instruction was being given to children by members of
a religious organization in a building supported by public money.
The court expressed some doubt concerning the degree of religious
instruction permissible in public schools. After expressing the
hope that the United States Supreme Court would answer that
question, the New Mexico court made the following statement:
We think it better to await their decision than to announce a rule

on the subject at this time. However, we take this occasion to say
that while we oppose the teaching of sectarian religion or the giving
of control of the state or any of its agencies to any sect or combination of sects, yet we know religion itself is so intermingled in the
1 ............

N. M .............. 236 P. 2d 949 (1951).
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daily life of our people and in the administration of and in the
affairs of state that no wall of absolute separation of religion and
state can be maintained-but few would want it.2
Support for this attitude is found in the opinion delivered by
Mr. Justice Douglas in the case of Zorach v. Clauson,5 decided
April 28, 1952. The Justice said there:
The First Amendment, however, does not say that in every and
all respects there shall be a separation of Church and State. Rather,
it studiously defines the manner, the specific ways, in which there
shall be no concert or union or dependency one on the other. That
is the common sense of the matter. Otherwise the state and religion
would be aliens to each other-hostile, suspicious, and even unfriendly. Churches could not be required to pay even property taxes.
• .. Policemen who helped parishioners into their places of worship would violate the Constitution.

The Zorach case involved a different set of facts altogether, however. There, children desiring to do so were excused from school
to attend religious training at another place, such instruction being
given by sectarian teachers. Children not wishing to participate in
such training were kept at school, although formal instruction was
suspended during this period. The election was voluntary, but once
the choice to receive religious instruction was made, records were
kept by the school of absences from the religious training. The
Court upheld the program, Justice Douglas stating that "....

[the

State government] can close its doors or suspend its operations
as to those who want to repair to their religious sanctuary for worship or instruction.""
Justice Frankfurter, in a vigorous dissent, criticized the decision
and lamented the fact that a public instrumentality, the school,
was being utilized as a method of supplying stude nts to a religious
training program, although perhaps the utilization was not direct.
The Justice also disapproved of the decision on the ground that
the petitioners were not allowed to show that actual coercion was
used upon parents and children to secure the attendance of the
2 236 P. 2d at 968.

3 72 S. Ct. 679, 683.
4Id.
at 684.
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children at the religious instruction. Justice Frankfurter was of
the opinion that it was entirely possible that some form of moral
coercion could be inherently present in the system as it was operated. The dissent of Mr. Frankfurter concludes with this interesting paragraph:
The deeply divisive controversy aroused by the attempts to secure
public school pupils for sectarian instruction would promptly end if
the advocates of such instruction were content to have the school
"close its doors or suspend operations"-that is, dismiss classes in
their entirety, without discrimination-instead of seeking to use the
public schools as the instrument for security of attendance at denominational classes. The unwillingness of the promoters to dispense with
such use of the public schools betrays a surprising want of confidence
in the inherent power of the various faiths to draw children to outside sectarian classes-an attitude that hardly reflects the faith of
the greatest religious spirits.5
Justice Jackson, in a dissent, opined that the Zorach judgment
"will be more interesting to students of psychology and of the
judicial processes than to students of constitutional law," his
belief being that the "wall which the Court was professing to erect
between Church and State [in the McCollum v. Board of Education
case 6 ] has become even more warped and twisted" than he had
expected.
The McCullom decision was also utilized by Justice Black in
his dissent in the Zorach case. Likewise, the New Mexico Supreme
Court, in the principal case, leaned heavily on the doctrines set
forth in that decision. In the McCullom case the classrooms were
turned over to religious instructors during school hours. The Court
held that such practice violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution, which prohibit the state from establishing religion or forbidding its free exercise. The opinion of the
McCullom case contains the following:
Pupils compelled by law to go to school for secular education are
released in part from their legal duty upon the condition that they
attend religious classes. This is beyond all question a utilization of
5 Id. at 688.
8 333

U. S. 203 (1948).
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the tax-established and tax-supported public school system to aid
religious groups to spread their faiths. And it falls squarely under
the ban of the First Amendment.7

Reference is made in this case to Everson v. Board of Education,' where it is stated again that "[n]either a state nor the Federal Government can ... pass laws which aid one religion, aid all
religions, or prefer one religion over another."
The principle applied by the Supreme Court of the United States
in the McCullom case and by the New Mexico Court in the Zellers
opinion seems well established. The difficulty arises in middleroad cases such as the recent Zorach case, where, in this writer's
mind, the dissenting opinions were the more logical and more carefully thought out.
VALIDITY OF LOYALTY OATH

Oklahoma. A taxpayer sought to enjoin the Board of Regents of
the Oklahoma Agricultural Colleges from paying the salaries of
teachers who had not signed a loyalty oath required by statute.
The Supreme Court of Oklahoma, affirming the decision of the
district court, held: the oath required does not (1) violate the
right of contract, (2) deprive public officials and employees of
property or liberty without due process of law, or (3) interfere
with religious freedom; nor is the statute requiring such an oath
a bill of attainder or an ex post facto law.9
The oath in question contained, among other clauses, the following:
I do solemnly swear that I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the State of Oklahoma against all enemies, foreign and domestic.
During the term of employment by the State, the signers of the
oath agreed:
I will not advocate and . . . will not become a member of any
party or organization, political or otherwise, that advocates the
' Id. at 209, 210.
8 330 U. S. 1, 15 (1946).
9 Board of Regents v. Updegraff,

.kh..-..

237 P. 2d 131 (1951).
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overthrow of the Government of the United States or of the State
of Oklahoma by force or violence or other unlawful means.
No compensation nor reimbursement for expenses incurred shall
be paid to any political officer or employee by any public agency
unless such officer or employee has taken and subscribed to the oath
or affirmation required by this Act.
(1) It is a widely accepted principle of law that a contract not
contrary to public policy will be protected by the Constitution from
hostile legislation; but the United States Supreme Court, as early
as 1898, modified this doctrine by holding:
Where . . . the respective parties are not private persons, dealing
with matters and things in which the public has no concern, but are
persons or corporations whose rights and powers were created for
public purposes, by legislative acts, and where the subject matter of
the contract is one which affects the safety and welfare of the public,
other principles apply. Contracts of the latter description are held to
be within the supervising power and control of the legislature when
exercised to protect the public safety, health and morals, and that
clause of the Federal Constitution which protects contracts from legis10
lative action cannot in every case be successfully invoked.
Even earlier, in 1877, the Supreme Court bad affirmed the right
of the government to employ its police power in order to protect
the lives, health, and property of its citizens or to preserve good
order and the public morals.1" There seems little doubt, then, that
a legislative body does have the power and right to interfere with
or to limit the contracting rights of certain of its citizens when
some right or safeguard of the people as a whole is possibly in
jeopardy. 2
(2) The teachers involved were not successful with their claim
that their personal property or liberty was taken without due process of law. Their contention was that they, as citizens, had the
right under the Constitution to engage in any employment they
desired and that the requirement of the oath, by its very terms,
restricted that right.
Judicial holdings have been numerous, however, which have
10 Chicago, Burlington and Quincy R. Co. v. Nebraska, 170 U. S. 57 (1898).
11 Beer Co. v. Massachusetts, 97 U. S. 25 (1877).

12 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296 (1940).
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established the principle that private freedom is always subject
to restrictions if such restrictions are deemed necessary or desirable to protect the public safety and welfare."3 In line with such
concepts, a public institution is not compelled by some vague constitutional right to employ workers without imposing any terms
or conditions.' 4 The teachers, although employees of the State, had
no constitutional right to be so employed. "It belongs to the State
...to prescribe the conditions upon which it will permit public

work to be done on its behalf, or on behalf of its municipalities."'"
(3) Some of the teachers who refused to sign the oath did so
as conscientious objectors, contending that the oath invaded their
right to religious freedom guaranteed by the Federal and State
Constitutions. They based their contention upon that clause of the
oath which read as follows: ".

.

. I will take up arms in the

defense of the United States in time of War, or National Emergency, if necessary." The Oklahoma Court pointed out that the
concept of religious freedom had two aspects, freedom to believe
and freedom to act. The first is absolute; the second is not, but
is subject to governmental regulation for the protection of society.' 6 Provision has always been made in time of war for conscientious objectors, but the court emphasized that the right to
such provision is not guaranteed by any constitutional phrase or
clause. Should such allowance be refused, there could be no
question but that the objecting parties would be disobeying the
13 The courts have sustained a complete regulatory control over professions directly
concerned with the public health. Reetz v. Michigan, 188 U. S. 505 (1903) ; Dent v.
West Virginia, 129 U. S. 114 (1889). Compulsory vaccination has been sustained.
Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U. S. 11 (1905). The Court has also sustained a city
ordinance forbidding the burial of the dead within the city limits as being detrimental
to the public health. Laurel Hill Cemetery v. City and County of San Francisco, 216
U. S. 358 (1910). In another field, the Court has sustained the validity of "blue-sky"
laws, regulating the sale of securities. Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U. S. 539 (1917).
14 Heim v. McCall, 239 U. S. 175 (1915) ; Ellis v. U. S., 206 U. S. 246 (1907) ; Mc.
Auliffe v. Mayor of City of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 29 N. E. 517 (1892) ; People
v.Crane, 214 N. Y. 154, 108 N. E. 427 (1915).
15 Atkin v. Kansas, 191 U. S. 207, 222 (1903).
16 Cantwell v. Connecticut, cited supra note 12.
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law if they refused to bear arms, regardless of their strong religious beliefs.1"
The loyalty oath was also attacked as being both a bill of
attainder and an ex post facto law, both of which contentions the
court denied.
Regarding the bill of attainder, the Oklahoma court referred
to a then new United States Supreme Court decision, Garner v.
Board of Public Works of Los Angeles,"8 decided June 4, 1951.
There Justice Clark, in delivering the opinion of the Court, followed the definition stated by an earlier Court and held that bills
of attainder are "legislative acts... that apply either to named
individuals or to easily ascertainable members of a group in such
a way as to inflict punishment on them without a judicial trial."' 9
Punishment is a prerequisite to a bill of attainder; and the Supreme Court concluded that punishment is not imposed "by a general regulation which merely provides standards of qualification
and eligibility for employment."0 The Garner case concerned the
failure of employees of the City of Los Angeles to sign a loyalty
oath much like the one in question in the principal case.
The Oklahoma court dismissed the issue of ex post facto law
in much the same manner as the bill of attainder issue. The court
stated that punishment is also a necessary factor in an ex post
facto law and concluded that the action contemplated by the
statute cannot be construed as punishment.2
There seems little room to doubt that the Oklahoma court was
correct in its holdings and that the decision, if appealed, would
ITIn re Summers, 325 U. S. 561 (1945), involved the refusal to admit a conscientious
objector to the practice of law. The Court said: "It is impossible for us to conclude
that the insistence of Illinois that an officer who is charged with the administration of
justice must take an oath to support the Constitution of Illinois and Illinois' interpretation of that oath to require a willingness to perform military service violates the
principles of religious freedom which the Fourteenth Amendment secures against state
action, when a like interpretation of a similar oath as to the Federal Constitution bars
an alien from national citizenship." Id. at 573. There were four dissents in this case.
"8341 U. S. 716.
1- U. S. v. Lovett, 328 U. S. 303, 315 (1946).
20 Id. at 722.
21

Ibid.
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be affirmed by the Federal Supreme Court. The danger and threat
to the nation and to each person individually, arising from the
growth and spread of Communistic teachings and practices, has
for some time now been considered grave. Governmental units,
both State and Federal, have the unquestioned right to oppose,
by whatever means appropriate, the spread of any such doctrines
and practices. Of this fact the United State Supreme Court has
left no doubt.
RESTRICTIVE RACIAL COVENANTS AND MONEY DAMAGES

Oklahoma. In Correll v. Earley" Correll and another sought
to enforce covenants which forbade the sale, lease, or gift of
property in a certain block to any person of the Negro or African
race. Defendants were alleged to have conspired and to have
broken the agreement maliciously for the purpose of reducing the
value of Correll's land. For such malicious acts and the alleged
resulting harm, plaintiffs sought damages. The district court dismissed the case. The Oklahoma Supreme Court held that a cause
of action for conspiracy was stated and awarded damages.
During the pendency of this case, the famous Shelley v. Kraemer
decision was rendered,2" which forbade the enforcement of restrictive covenants affecting racial groups on the ground that
equal protection of the laws would thus be denied. The action
sought and denied by the United States Supreme Court in the
Shelley case was an injunction forcing the colored tenant to vacate
the premises, i.e., an equitable remedy. At the time, there was considerable legal speculation concerning the action the Court would
have taken had the relief sought been money damages. It is a
widely accepted principle of contract law that an action at law
for damages resulting from a breach of contract will lie in many
instances where equity will deny specific performance of the contract. 24 Consequently, the issue of the availability of damages in
----- Okla.
_
237 P. 2d 1017 (1951).
28 334 U. S. 1 (1948).
24 See 49 AM. Jur., Specific Performance, § 6.

22
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case of breach of such a restrictive covenant in a contract was left
very much open.
The first case to pass upon the constitutionality of an award for
money damages was Weiss v. Leaon." The Missouri court held
that "enforcement," as used by the Supreme Court in the Shelley
case, referred only to the equitable remedy of specific performance. This holding has met with disapproval in many quarters. It has been doubted that the Weiss opinion would be affirmed
if appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States. 6 One
writer has aptly phrased the argument: "It was not the particular
way in which the state courts were enforcing the covenants, but
the fact that they were enforcing them at all, that the Supreme
Court found repugnant in the Shelley case." 27
It has been felt that the term "enforcement" embraces both
legal and equitable actions. Constitutionally, the difference between the two is one of degree rather than one of substance."
Specific performance and damages are merely different methods
of enforcement. 9 The Shelley case has been discussed widely,
and its implications have been painstakingly explored by legal
writers. Most commentators have approved the decision, and many
have concluded that the opinion forbids enforcement both by
injunction or by way of damages.30
It is admitted that, under usual conditions, when a person
agrees with another that he will perform or will not perform in
a specified manner, he should expect to pay for the damage
caused to the wronged party as a result of the breach of the agree,225 S. W. 2d 127 (1949).
Mo.
See Note, 30 B. U. L. Rev. 273, 274 (1950).
27 See Note, 18 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 417, 418 (1949).
'28 See Note, 30 B. U. L. Rev. 273 (1950).
29 Ibid.
so Lathrop, The Racial Covenant Cases, 1948 Wis. L. Rev. 508, 525, 527; Ming,
Racial Restrictions and the Fourteenth Amendment: The Restrictive Covenant Cases,
16 U. Chi. L. Rev. 203, 217, 224 (1949) ; Scanlan, Racial Restrictions in Real EstateProperty Values Versus Human Values, 24 Notre Dame Law. 157, 182 (1948) ; Notes,
17 Univ. of Cin. L. Rev. 277 (1948), 48 Col. L. Rev. 1241, 1244 (1948), 46 Mich. L
Rev. 978, 979 (1948), 27 N. C. L. Rev. 224, 230, n. 22 (1948), 21 So. Calif. L. Rev. 358,
365 (1948).
25

26
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ment. A promise to discriminate against a race of people, however, is felt to be "odious to a free people whose institutions are
founded upon the doctrine of equality." 1 The performance of
such a promise creates a greater evil than does the breach of a
32
covenant.
It should not be said, however, that the Oklahoma court erred
in its holding in the principal case; for another element was present which was missing, apparently, in the Weiss situation. The
original white owner in the Correll case, to avoid having to pay
damages for breach of the covenant, entered into conspiracy to
convey to one who was not financially responsible, which party
then was to convey to the Negro purchaser. On this basis then,
one of malice and conspiracy. the court held that the plaintiff did
present a good cause of action.
Those who believe that the Shelley decision should be limited
in application to the fact situation presented in that case would
doubtless contend that the action forbidden by the Court there
was the actual ejectment of the Negro occupant of the property.
The plaintiff in the Shelley case sought actually to prevent the
occupation of the land by Negroes; the present case does not seek
this, directly at least, but rather demands payment from the
grantor for the reduction of value of the land resulting from his
conveyance to a member of the Negro race. It is submitted, however, that the Shelley case, at least in principle, was based upon
discrimination, and that discrimination is present in any case such
as this involving restrictive covenants. The moral principle, not
the particular facts, would doubtless lead the Supreme Court to
expand the reasoning of the Shelley case to include fact situations
such as the present.
The writer believes that the Correll case does not conflict,
though, with the prevailing view that restrictive covenants will be
enforced neither by specific performance nor by actions for dam31 Perez v. Lippold, 32 Cal. 2d 711, 198 P. 2d 17 (1948).
32 See Recent Cases, 98 U. Pa. L. Rev. 588 (1950).

